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Introduction
China has deeply integrated into the global economy. Yet China’s experimentalist reform path has
created its own distinctive economic system (Zheng and Huang 2018, Naughton 2021, Weber 2021).
An increasing number of studies set out to discern the specific nature of China’s capitalism (e.g.,
Huang 2008, McNally 2012, ten Brink 2019, Chen 2020, Nölke et al. 2020). China is found to be sui
generis, but the specific state–market relations that characterise China’s variant of capitalism remain
theoretically vague (de Graaff 2020, p. 884).
Some scholars describe China as neoliberal, but this does not reveal much about the more specific
nature of China’s system (Weber 2019, 2020). Others, pointing to the important role of the state,
suggest China’s system is state capitalist (Naughton and Tsai 2015, Pearson et al. 2020, Petry 2020b).
But a recent literature review finds that ‘[d]espite the widespread mobilization of the concept [state
capitalism] for both categorization and explanation, there is neither consensus about what it exactly
means nor about its implications’ (Alami and Dixon 2020, p. 71). On the surface, it appears
contradictory that China could be described as both neoliberal and state capitalist. This conflicted
state of the literature points to a key characteristic of China’s system: the strong state is deeply entwined
with a fundamentally marketised economy. Depending on which of these two aspects of China’s system
one focuses on, it may appear as either neoliberal or state capitalist. The precise nature of the relation
between this strong state and far-ranging, deep markets requires further conceptual clarification.
In international political economy (IPE) literature the concept of state-permeated capitalism (SPC) is
widely applied to capture the nature of China’s economic system. By highlighting the political frictions
and often diverging interests across different business and state actors as well as the reliance on
relations of loyalty and trust within the Chinese system, SPC overcomes the false concept that the
Chinese state is a unified monolith (ten Brink 2019, Allen et al. 2020). SPC has also initiated rich case
studies that characterise important economic institutions in China. Yet the economic mechanisms
underpinning state–market relations remain vague on a conceptual level. Moreover, the concept of
state permeation implicitly relies on a separation between state and market that does not reflect their
mutually constitutive nature. After all, for a thing to ‘permeate’ another, one thing has to be external
to the other. As such, Massot’s (2020) recent critique, that the IPE literature analytically relies on
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starting from state and market as separate sphere, applies. A binary conception of state versus market,
however, conflicts with the fact that China’s market economy has been constituted by the state since
the very beginning of re-marketisation in the late 1970s, as argued by Zheng and Huang (2018) and
Weber (2021).
A similar critique applies to the concept of a developmental state. Here the emphasis is on the
independent nature of the state in relation to the market which also amounts to conceptualising the
two as autonomous spheres (Fine 2013, p. 5). Furthermore, the developmental state has been derived
through an inductive study of East Asian development successes such as Japan (e.g., Johnson 1982),
Taiwan (e.g., Wade 1990) and South Korea (e.g., Amsden 1989). We propose that the Chinese case
requires a similar inductive treatment to derive a conceptualisation of its state–market relations rather
than a simple importation of the concepts derived from the experience of the Asian Tigers. This would
amount to a reimportation of some sort, since the developmental state as it emerged in the neighboring
cases has deep roots in Chinese history (Helleiner 2021b). Beyond these shared origins the different
scales of the development challenges of the Asian Tigers compared with those of China have led to
different economic models. As influential reform economist Deng Yingtao (2014 [1991]) argued, while
China can use exports as one element of its development strategy, the challenge of economic
development on the scale of China goes far beyond the task of (re-)integrating China into the global
economy in a state-led fashion and involves the creation of a new kind of domestic economy.1
In this article, we develop the concept of a state-constituted market economy as an analytical framework to
unpack a set of economic mechanisms that underpin state–market relations in China. We use constituted
in three meanings of the word as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary: (1) ‘to make, set up or
establish something’, (2) ‘to be the elements or material of which the thing spoken of consists’, and
(3) ‘to frame, form’. Each of these meanings points to one dimension of the state’s constitutive relation
to essential realms of the market economy. The first meaning corresponds to the Chinese state’s
activist role in market creation both historically and as a continued process. The second meaning
captures the idea that the state is a key participator in essential markets. The third meaning points to
the state’s efforts in steering markets for essentials. We refer to a market economy rather than
capitalism since our analysis in this short paper is limited to conceptualising modes of state–market
Also see Ang (2016) for a critique of interpreting China’s development as an instance of the East Asian developmental
state.
1
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constitution rather than providing a full-fledged analysis of China’s entire mode of production. We
define a market economy as an economy in which production is predominantly for sale on the market
and organised through market relations such that all members of society depend in important ways
on markets in fulfilling their needs and desires. Market relations are not accidental but engrained in
the social relations and mediated through money.
This paper makes two contributions beyond its main aim of providing a new theoretical lens for the
study of China’s state–market relations. First, we respond to Helleiner’s (2021b, p. 10) recent call: ‘It
is long past time for [the] intellectual bias [of Western-centrism] to be transcended, including for the
very practical reason that the ideas of non-Western thinkers – including the Chinese ones … – have
left important legacies that endure to this day.’ The comparative capitalism research program has been
criticised for its neglect of domestic historical foundations and its tendency to use Western experience
and models as standards against which other regions of the world are measured. 2 In this paper we
draw on the Chinese intellectual tradition referenced by Helleiner and show how China’s stateconstituted market economy is deeply rooted in China’s own statecraft tradition. In drawing on
China’s history to make sense of its present political economy we built on a nascent trend in the
literature (e.g., Arrighi 2007, Heilmann and Perry 2011, Zheng and Huang 2018, Nolan 2018a, 2021,
Huang 2019, Helleiner 2021a, b, Weber 2021).
Second, we connect the study of China’s market economy to conceptual scholarship on the US
economy to avoid essentialising China or creating an unnecessary binary of China versus the West. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a comparison of state–market relations in the US and
China. But by showing that a conceptual framework developed for the US case can be integrated into
our conceptual framework for the Chinese case we establish the possibility of theoretical crossfertilisation. To this end we employ concepts of state market-participation and strategically significant
prices devised by Hockett and Omarova (2015, 2016). This is possible thanks to a shared ‘explicit
recognition of the fact that states and markets … are inseparable and deeply interconnected parts of
the nation’s economic organism’ (Hockett and Omarova 2015, p. 122).
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See Schedelik et al. (2020) for a critical review of the state of the literature in comparative capitalism research.
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It is noteworthy that these two contributions are intellectually connected. Omarova and Hockett
developed their concepts building on Keynes’s work on buffer stocks. Keynes’s work in turn has been
inspired by the Chinese traditional granary system as brought into the interwar policy discourse by
Henry Wallace (Chaomin Li 2016, Weber 2021, p. 50) and Benjamin Graham (1937). We readapt and
extend their concepts to the Chinese context by drawing on China’s history of statecraft, the
Communists strategies of economic warfare and the history of economic reform as well as by using
examples of China’s contemporary political economy including China’s response to the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic.
Essential versus nonessential: Distinguishing economic spheres
Our analysis of modes of state–market relations in China is based on a distinction between essential
and nonessential spheres of the economy. The modern Chinese state focuses its market-constituting
governance on the essential as a way to govern the economy as a whole. State–market relations vary
radically between essential and nonessential spheres. Both essential and nonessential spheres are
organised through the market, but in the essential sphere the market is continuously and actively
constituted by the state.
In China’s tradition of statecraft, a clear distinction between the essential and the nonessential has
long occupied a prominent place in principles of government. An early example is the so-called
qingzhong, or light–heavy, theory of the ancient government manual Guanzi (Weber 2021). Ye (2014, p.
98) translates the art of qingzhong (轻重) as ‘weighing and balancing economic forces’. The task of
economic policy in this theory is, in the words of the Guanzi, ‘To use the thing that is “heavy” to shoot
at that which is “light,” to use the cheap to level down the dear’ (Guanzi as in Hu 2009, p. 127). From
this perspective, all economic phenomena can only be understood in relation to their social context;
things can be heavy or light only in relation to other things. Heavy commodities are considered
essential to production or human well-being, and light commodities are seen as inessential. While
some things are by their nature important to production and human well-being, such as grain, salt and
iron to use the examples in the Guanzi, the economic weight of commodities is also subject to
continuous change and reflects the season of the year, production practices, technologies and market
dynamics, among other factors.
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Our definition of essential derives from this relational logic and draws on the experience of the COVID19 pandemic. When faced with the need to impose lockdowns, the question of what and who are
essential has become a central policy question around the world (Stevano et al. 2021). It was settled in
an ad hoc fashion based on what governments perceived as essential for the basic working of society
and economy. Taking a lead from this experience, we refer to goods, assets and services as essential when they
are systemically significant from the perspective of the state. We are not arguing from a normative standpoint
what ought to be essential and our understanding of ‘essential’ is historically contingent; evolves with
changing material, social, political and economic conditions; and is shaped by the contestation between
state actors and the interplay with social forces outside the state. A change in circumstances such as
during the outbreak of a pandemic can shift the boundaries between essential and nonessential.
In using the notion of ‘systemically significant’ we build on the concept of Hockett and Omarova
(2016). They define as ‘systemically significant’ all those prices of commodities that are ubiquitous in
production; of investments that are ubiquitous in certain asset classes; and that are ubiquitous as
benchmarks for other prices. We go beyond their focus on ubiquity. Taking inspiration from the
shutdown experience and Chinese statecraft, we define as systemically significant all those economic activities,
assets or commodities the absence of which are considered by the state to undermine financial, social or political stability
or economic security or which are crucial in the pursuit of economic development and other major policy goals. Since we
focus on analyzing state–market relations, we limit our analysis to systemically significant aspects that
are organised primarily through market mechanisms.3
Scholars have emphasised that economic governance in China is based on an institutional hierarchy
that divides the economy into tiers (e.g., Pearson 2015). The most strategic industries (e.g., metals,
energy, pharmaceuticals) are tightly controlled by the state and dominated by central state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Businesses on lower tiers are governed through regulations rather than direct
oversight by the government. In parallel to such a tier-based business system, scholars emphasise the
importance of central-local relations, local experimentation and competition between different
localities (e.g., Heilmann 2008). Our definition of essential is in accordance with such a hierarchical
view of economic governance in China, but we structure our analysis around the time-variant systemic

Importantly, we thus exclude all the systemically significant care work that happens within households and beyond
markets. We believe care is so important, while operating based on different principles, that it requires a separate
analysis.
3
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significance or essentialness of economic activities, assets and commodities to open up a new
dimension of analysis. Scholars have also used a Polanyian framework that emphasises the essential
factors of production, labor, credit and land (Zheng and Huang 2018, p. 275). This approach overlaps
with ours, but in addition to the time-invariant Polanyian factors of production, we consider a dynamic
element: certain assets, activities or goods can become essential on account of changing circumstances
(e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic) or structural environments (e.g., climate change).
Three modes of state–market relations: Creation, stabilisation and steering
This section develops three key modes of China’s state–market relations in the essential spheres of
the economy: creation, stabilisation and steering of markets through the state. We illustrate empirical
examples for each of these three modes in the table in the Appendix.

Mode 1: State market-creation
Market creation in the Chinese context involves ‘market making’ as defined by Hockett and Omarova
(2015) but also an even more foundational task. In their definition a market-making state is one that
helps ‘to create and maintain market exchange of specific assets—goods, services, financial
instruments—by ensuring the continuous availability of, and thereby inducing confidence in,
prospective counterparties to every trade’. To fulfill this function ‘the market-maker agrees to bear
two complementary types of risks’: the risk of the seller that the commodity in question does not sell
is overcome by the state acting as ‘buyer of last resort’, while the risk of the buyer of not finding the
product they are trying to buy is ameliorated by the state acting as ‘seller of last resort’. They propose
that the state should ameliorate the uncertainty of exchange inherent in market dependency not only
on the aggregate level through macroeconomic stabilisation but through state participation in specific
markets.
In this definition of market-making the marketplace and the market players are assumed as being in
place when the state comes in. In the course of economic reforms in China the state has and continues
to create markets from scratch. Our definition of state market-creation therefore posits that the state
constitutes the basic infrastructure for market relations, often including the market players themselves, who are at times
created and at other times mobilised by the state. This infrastructure can take a physical form, such as new
transportation that creates new market links, an informational form, as for example the creation of
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digital marketplaces, or an organisational form, as in the case of the creation of China’s national
champions. The state can act as both a market creator, when it is establishing entirely new markets,
and a market actor, when it is deepening or expanding existing markets. In particular, the state can
play a crucial role in what Harvey has conceptualised as annihilating space with time, expanding the
frontier of the market by revolutionising means of communication and transportation (Harvey 2007,
p. 337). Through market creation the state facilitates a deepening of the division of labor locally,
nationally and in relation to the global economy. The state ensures the continued harnessing of the
expansive forces of the market while structuring the markets for essentials in a way that enables the
state to maintain its power.
Our definition of state market-creation is inspired by Polanyi (2001 [1944]). But while Polanyi
emphasises the role of the state in the creation of the national market in Europe’s capitalist
transformation, we focus on state market-creation in China as both a historical process and an ongoing
process. Our concept of state market-creation is closely related to Ang’s (2016) theory of market
building and the coevolution of state and markets. But where Ang suggests that at a certain stage of
development, market building gives way to market preserving, we argue that state market-creation is
a continuous characteristic of China’s economic system. Mazzucato (2013) develops the market
creating and shaping functions of entrepreneurial states in relation to innovation at various stages of
development. As Mazzucato illustrates based on the example of the solar energy sector, the Chinese
state – like the US in the twentieth century – has become a leading example for an entrepreneurial
state. Such innovation-oriented activities are included in our definition of state market-creation and
steering (see next section). But our definition of state market-creation goes beyond innovation and
includes all essential spheres of the economy.
In China’s recent history state market-creation has occupied a central place at two critical junctures:
during the Civil War and again during the reform period. At both moments markets had become
peripheral. During the Chinese Civil War hyperinflation was rampant and the economy had
disintegrated to a degree that many peasants reverted to subsistence production. We can think of this
as a collapse of the division of labor. The market had ceased to function as a coordinating mechanism
for the economy as a whole as trading routes were blocked by the war. In this context, the Communists
reverted to ancient statecraft techniques in their economic warfare. They stabilised the value of their
currency through recreating markets for essential goods such as salt and grain and by establishing

8

trading agencies that reinstated commercial links. This involved some of China’s most influential
economic thinkers and policy makers of the twentieth century, such as Chen Yun and Xue Muqiao
(Weber 2021).
During the Mao era markets did not disappear entirely, but they were politically suppressed (Perkins
1966, Zheng and Huang 2018, p. 250–1). At the dawn of reform one key question was how to recreate
markets in the context of a command economy. China considered but ultimately rejected the logic of
shock therapy that would have relied on destroying the planned economy to make space for markets
to emerge spontaneously. Instead, China pursued a path of marketisation that consisted of a
combination of liberalising peripheral sectors and using the planning institutions as market creators.
This eventually transformed SOEs from units that implemented commands into market-oriented
businesses (Weber 2021).
But state market-creation is not only part of China’s revolutionary and reform history. Rather, it is a
continued practice. This is illustrated in recent case studies (see the Appendix). Some examples are the
China Development Bank (Chen 2020), the creation of domestic capital markets and their gradual
integration with global markets (Petry 2020a, b) as well as China’s massive construction of
infrastructure in recent decades such as the Belt and Road Initiative and high-speed railways. The
market-creating role of the state was again saliant during the COVID-19 crisis, when the lockdown
policy paused the flow of market activities and blocked normal connections between sellers and buyers.
In this emergency, the state quickly transformed the norms for the essential food markets and
reestablished commercial connections (Weber and Qi 2021).

Mode 2: State market-stabilisation
At the core of our concept of state market-stabilisation is what Hockett and Omarova (2015, p. 137)
call the ‘government-as-market-actor modality’. The state participates in the market for essential goods
to stabilise supply and demand by mobilising whatever side falls short. This is similar to the ways in
which central banks open market transactions. It happens both in state and privately created markets
and aims to smoothen fluctuations, particularly of systemically significant prices of essential goods. A
rapid, large change of these prices would have major ripple effects across the economy and have the
potential to undermine stability by rendering key products out of reach or triggering cost-push
inflation. State market-stabilisation aims to ameliorate the uncertainties and instabilities inherent in
9

markets. By the same token it enables very wide-ranging market reliance. It also amounts to a different
mode of macroeconomic stabilisation.
Hockett and Omarova consider ‘market-preserving’ as a sub-case of market-making for emergencies
that refers to the specific situation of a panic sell-off when individual market actors cannot afford to
wait and see how things evolve but a public instrumentality can step in and countervail a free fall. In
China state market-stabilisation includes market stabilising state participation that ranges from
counterbalancing normal fluctuations to market-preserving emergency measures such as in the context
of the 2015 stock market crisis.
China looks back on a long history of state market-participation. The ancient text Guanzi states,
When things are plentiful, they will be cheap; when they are scarce, they will be expensive. ...
Knowing this to be so, the prince pays attention to his country’s surpluses and shortages and
manages its wealth and goods. When grain is cheap, he exchanges money for food. ... He pays
attention to the relative value (qingzhong) of things and manages them in order to maintain
price stability. Therefore, the expensive and the cheap may be harmonized and the prince
reaps his profits. (Guanzi as in Rickett 1993, p. 384)
The basic logic of the statecraft techniques of qingzhong can be illustrated based on the Ever Normal
Granaries that were a core institution in imperial China (Will and Wong 1991). Grain markets are
inherently unstable due to the changes of seasons that brings about regular fluctuations in supply and
prices. In addition, the bad harvests can create extreme price fluctuations or even famines. The public
granaries were meant to add demand around harvest time and lift the price, while adding supply when
the private supplies were fading in spring and summer, thus preventing price hikes by private
merchants.
During the Mao period state market-participation was replaced with the unified system of purchase
and sales for grain and other essential agricultural goods. The state monopolised the grain trade (Ash
2006). In the early years of reform and opening-up, grain markets were re-introduced as households
were allowed to produce for the market once they had fulfilled their share in the state-commanded
grain output quota. As a result, state market-participation reemerged for grain and has been
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considerably strengthened in more recent years, especially in the context of the violent world food
price fluctuations in the 2000s (Huang and Yang 2017).
China today commands buffer stocks, operated by state agencies or state-owned firms in an analogous
fashion, for staple food items such as pork, sugar and oil and essential producer goods such as metals
and oil, as well as medical supplies. Some key institutions are the National Reform and Development
Commission, the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration and more specialised reserves
such as the China National Cotton Reserves Corporation. The size of reserves is not publicly known
for most stocks but is estimated to account for only a small share of the nationwide consumption,
with the exception of grain. The key to effectively utilising buffer stocks lies in leveraging reserves at
the right time.
Beyond reserves, market participation in a range of essential commodities requires complex state
capacity to monitor essential markets on a continuous basis and add supply either through imports or
the mobilisation of businesses through informal and formal ties. Critically, the mostly state-owned
banking system in China can also facilitate counterbalancing investment through preferential credit
treatment or increasing capital requirements, as has been the case under the so-called ‘three red lines’
in the real estate sector since 2020 (Bloomberg 2020).
In the context of the inflationary pressures that have arisen in the aftermath of the COVID-19
pandemic recoveries, the specific logic of China’s state market-stabilisation also became salient. While
in the rest of the world the debate around a potential stabilising state intervention has focused on a
tightening of monetary policy, the Chinese government focused its efforts on stabilising the prices of
key commodities that showed rapid price rises in the first months of 2021. To be sure, interventions
that are intended to counter the building up of bubbles can also themselves induce instabilities, as
happened in 2015 and might happen again in the ongoing Evergrande debt crisis. In the table in the
Appendix we illustrate state market-participation based on recent examples.

Mode 3: State market-steering
The goals of the Chinese state go beyond the act of creating markets as an end in itself or stabilising
the economy in its existing configuration. The Chinese government has a long-term agenda and is
characterised by the bolt ambitions of an ‘entrepreneurial party state’ (ten Brink 2019). In the pursuit
of broad policy goals such as redistribution, resilience or environmental sustainability, markets are

11

shaped and steered. This practice includes what Hockett and Omarova (2015, p. 129) define as ‘market
moving’ – actively alternating prices through state market-participation towards meeting policy goals
– along with the whole realm of policy tools conceptualized in Mazzucato’s Entrepreneurial State. The
basic mechanism is similar to that described in the previous section for stabilisation and can involve
market creation. There is an analytical overlap, but rather than aiming to recreate an existing market
balance in its steering mode the state participates in the market to create a new balance.
Market-moving has a long history in Chinese fiscal policy. In traditional statecraft the state
monopolised the salt trade and limited supply in order to extract revenue from high prices. State
commerce was also used as a way to absorb excess liquidity (回笼) by sales of expensive luxury goods.
Both techniques were used in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. Bringing the salt trade
under control was an important source of finance for the Communist revolution (Weber 2021). To
counter inflationary pressure after the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, cakes made with imported
Cuban sugar were sold at a high price to absorb excess liquidity of high-income households
(Lowenstein 2019).
Consciously setting prices in ways that diverge from costs was at the core of the Maoist price system
(Perkins 1966, Lardy 1984, Weber 2021). Prices were used as a mechanism for redistribution across
sectors. In the 1980s, China’s market reforms raised the question of what to do with this redistributive
price system. China abstained from a big bang in price reform that would have reset all prices overnight
and pursued a dual-track price system instead. The core of the old price system was initially left in
place while market prices emerged at the margins (Weber 2021). For most of the economy this dualtrack price system is long gone. But for certain essential upstream producer goods such as electricity
it continues as one element of China’s economic policy. For example, granting producing enterprises
access to a cheap energy supply is a way to encourage certain sectors. Importantly, the grain price also
continues to be steered by the state in the interest of the rural producers. When in the 2000s urban–
rural inequality had become so high that it began to endanger social stability, the Chinese government
mobilised and expanded the public grain reserve system. To increase farmers’ incomes and encourage
production, the state guaranteed a minimum procurement price for a range of major grains, thus
steering the market in favor of agricultural producers (Huang and Yang 2017).
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Market steering does not always require the direct participation of the state as a buyer or seller. It can
also guide the expectations of non-state players about new frontiers of expanding markets. China has
transferred the legacies of the planning system, particularly the five-year plan system, into indicative
planning (Heilmann and Melton 2013). A five-year plan proposes a variety of social and economic
goals, including aspirational rather than mandatory ones that serve to align expectations of non-state
players. This involves large-scale public investments and channels private investments into frontier
technologies and innovations. The state shapes profitability expectations with political commitments
on industry and macroeconomic levels as well as through financing by state-owned banks. The table
in the Appendix illustrates this point through the example of the electric car industry.

The state-constituted market economy
Bringing together the three modes of China’s state–market relations, we conceptualise the Chinese
economy as a state-constituted market economy that is characterised by the active state creation,
participation and steering of markets for essentials. China’s history of thought on markets goes back
to ancient times. It has a long tradition of considering the market as a ‘two-edged sword’ (双刃剑), a
progressive force that can unleash an enormous potential for an enhancement of the material
foundations of society but also dangerous in its potential to create vulnerabilities, instabilities and
crises (Nolan 2021, p. 35, 2018b). This resonates with Karl Marx’s analysis of capitalism as both the
most progressive and most crises-prone stage of development. For Marx this dual nature implies that
capitalism prepares its own demise and gives rise to revolutionary forces that should eventually
overcome the reliance on money and markets. In contrast to such a revolutionary solution attempted
in China under Mao, a strand of Chinese statecraft addresses the need to balance the regressive and
progressive sides of markets through state market-participation. Some of these techniques of
economic governance have been revived in the reform era (Weber 2021). As we will show, this
resonates but also goes beyond Keynes’s or a Keynesian vision.
The dual nature of capitalism is to some extent reflected in competing strands of scholarship in
comparative capitalism. This literature is divided into critical approaches that emphasise power
dynamics, social relations, uneven development, crises and instability (e.g., Peck 2007, Bruff 2011) and
contributions in the tradition of Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach that
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emphasize different forms of corporate governance as stable institutional arrangements that make
capitalism function. The framework of an SPC derived for emerging market economies takes on some
elements of critical political economy scholarship but is ultimately rooted in VoC and focused on the
question of how capitalism has enabled these countries to rise. SPC stresses the importance of
business–state elite networks grounded on personal relationships, competition between local alliances,
and the role of the central state in providing an overarching institutional architecture for this
competition in characterising ‘China’s mode of coordination’ (Nölke et al. 2020, p. 49). We consider
all these elements to be important but believe that the question of how the Chinese state tries to
reconcile the dynamic power and the inherent instability of markets remains undertheorised. By
focusing on this balancing act, we contribute to attempts to provide a dynamic view in contrast with
the often-static analysis inherent in VoC and its offshoots.
We share VoC’s critical stance towards a neoclassical framework (Coates 2015, p. 19). In neoclassical
economics, markets are one-dimensional, self-regulating spheres where the competitive interaction of
private buyers and sellers intermediated by the free movement of prices brings about an equilibrium.
In contrast, in practice, all market economies are sustained by some form of state action that
ameliorates at least some of the uncertainty and instability that arise from the reliance on market
exchanges. These mechanisms differ in degree and mode of operation. The state-constituted market
economy is characterised by a particularly intensive and extensive form of such uncertaintyameliorating policies as well as by a commitment on the part of the state to actively harness and
channel the progressive powers of markets. A brief comparative discussion on a conceptual level will
help us to develop this point.
On the most basic level all states provide a legal framework that sets rules for market behavior and
police those rules. Beyond that, on at least three levels the state can ameliorate the uncertainty of
exchange inherent in a market economy, corresponding with different schools of economic thought:
(1) by stabilising the value of money, (2) by stabilising aggregate demand, and (3) by stabilising
individual, important markets.
All modern states issue a fiat currency. All states also aim to stabilise the value of money to some
degree through monetary policy which can limit the uncertainties stemming from the monetary sphere
(1). Central banks create and participate in markets for fiat money to regulate the price of holding
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money (the interest rate). From the perspective of Friedmanite monetarism or the neoliberal tradition,
self-regulating market forces dominate over the inherent instability just outlined. Hence, stabilising
the value of money is the key to stabilising market economies as a whole (Hayek 1966 [1929]).
Conversely, the free market economy facilitated by stable prices is seen as the best arrangement to
unleash the virtues of the market. The free market does not mean a market free of the state. The state
polices the freedom of the market and encases it to protect it from the intervention of society or state
(Bonefeld 2013, 2017, Slobodian 2018).
From the angle of the postwar neoclassical synthesis, the state further has to stabilise aggregate market
relations through fiscal policy (2). Here, the inherent stability is mainly located on the macro level and
so are the ameliorating policies. Fiscal expansion adds to aggregate demand when effective demand is
falling short to prevent a deflationary contraction. The main task of the state is this macro stabilisation.
Keynes went further in his vision for an activist state. He argued for the socialisation of investment
which would serve to overcome substantial, inherent instability in a capitalist economy as well as to
unleash the full productive potential through industrial policy (Crotty 2017).
Later, Keynes added public buffer stocks for essential commodities to his proposed stabilisation
policies (Dimand and Dimand 1990, Fantacci et al. 2012) (3). Keynes was not the originator of such a
state market-participating policy. Benjamin Graham (1937) and Henry Wallace had previously
introduced this idea into the interwar policy debates, drawing inspiration from China’s Ever Normal
Granaries system and traditional statecraft (Will and Wong 1991). In fact, in China theories of state
market-participation go back to the aforementioned Guanzi and were revived, discussed and perfected
in imperial times (Zhao and Drechsler 2018, Zanasi 2020, Weber 2021). Keynes was aware of this
tradition of theorising since he reviewed a Ph.D. that surveys China’s history of economic thought
and covers state market-participation (Chen 1911, Keynes 1912).
If we add in macro-stabilisation, a substantial degree of socialisation of investment and public buffer
stocks for essential commodities, we move towards our concept of a state-constituted market
economy, but in our analytical framework for the study of China’s political economy, the state takes
on an even more constitutive role than that envisioned by Keynes. The state-constituted market
economy stabilises the value of money and the relation between aggregate supply and demand not only through indirect
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macroeconomic means of fiscal and monetary policy, but it also actively creates, participates in and steers markets for a
range of essential goods, activities and assets in pursuit of developmental goals.
The relation between the state and the market is subject to constant calibration and contestation in
China’s state-constituted market economy. Deng Xiaoping famously reinstated the market in the late
1970s to be a tool to serve the socialist state (Zheng and Huang 2018, Weber 2021). This is the
Smithian view of ‘markets as instruments of rule’ (Arrighi 2007, p. 8). But the market is not a simple
instrument, it takes on a life of its own. Active stabilisation of the market is a way to keep the market
dynamic under control. Commodity-level state market-participation does not erase the uncertainty
inherent in a market economy. But as the state acts as buyer and seller of last resort in a range of
markets with wide-ranging linkages across the economy, the uncertainty is more directly alleviated
than when relying on macro-interventions alone. To be sure, the economic precariousness that is
endogenous in being dependent on selling one’s labor for a living is not overcome and there is a
possibility of bankruptcy for individual firms. But the state smoothens fluctuations in essential markets
to contain risks that can lead to systemwide crises.
Esping-Andersen (1990) categorises welfare states by the degree of decommodification of essentials,
following Polanyi (2001 [1944]), who saw the laws of motion in the struggle over the
(de-)commodification of the so-called fictitious commodities land, labor and capital (Işıkara 2021).
While the Chinese state governs some essentials such as compulsory education and medical services
through decommodification, it governs other essentials such as grain and crucial raw materials through
state-constituted markets. Consequently, China’s economy is deeply marketised, and more state does
not mean less market (Zheng and Huang 2018). China’s economy is fully commodified in that basically
all production is for the market and large parts of everyday life are organised through exchange. But
this commodification is constituted by the state in the sense that the state organises the
commodification through market creation and pushes the boundaries of marketisation by internalising
uncertainties inherent in the commodity form.
An analogous assumption to the focus on decommodification is that more market means less state
capacity. The literature on the regulatory state of the neoliberal era, for example, emphasises ruling
through ‘governance’ as a result of marketisation. The regulatory state lacks state capacity beyond its
functions of setting and policing rules. This is juxtaposed with the state of the postwar era of advanced
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economies characterised by ‘government’ defined as ‘statecraft based on hierarchical, command-andcontrol systems which authoritatively mobilises resources and intervene directly to secure desired
social and economic outcomes’ (Jones and Hameiri 2021, p. 3). Similarly, the developmental state
model is often seen as relying on an all-powerful, centralised bureaucracy and state mobilisation
through command-and-order (Allen et al. 2020, p. 2). An opposition is drawn between more
hierarchical command-and-control and more market rather than between different ways and degrees
of the state’s engagement with markets that correspond with different forms of state capacity. In line
with Massot’s observations (2020), the market is thought of as a pure sphere of private actors, so that
more market always implies less state capacity. In contrast, in our framework of China’s stateconstituted market economy, intensified marketisation increases the uncertainties and instabilities
inherent in market dynamics and requires more, not less, state capacity. At the same time the state in
China is not an all-powerful, monolithic, centralised bureaucracy that penetrates the market on its own
terms as in the classical developmental state (Hui 2017, Zheng and Huang 2018, p. 31–2, Nogueira
and Qi 2019).
The concept of an SPC provides an answer to the conundrum of China’s marketisation under an
expansive state. The focus as regards state–market relations is on the firm level and on fragmented
interests in business-state alliances and cooperation within elite networks. These networks are
grounded on personal relations (guanxi) and a shared social background (Nölke et al. 2020). This ‘nonmarket mode of coordination’ (ibid., p. 49) is thought of as key to understanding China’s state–market
relations. This analytical lens resonates with approaches that emphasize crony capitalism.4 In addition
to informal ties, the rich literature on SOE governance illustrates the importance of bureaucratic
design by stressing the role of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC), cadre management systems that facilitate the rotation and dual assignments of executives
and state officials, party committees inside companies, and political campaigns to mobilise businesses
(Chen Li 2016, Leutert and Eaton 2021). Our framework is consistent with the importance of informal
business-state alliances as well as of bureaucratic design. 5 But beyond coordination through such
formal and informal non-market ties, we stress the importance of market-based coordination of
businesses through the state’s mobilisation of market dynamics. Formal and informal networks serve
as institutions that the state can draw on in its market-constituting activities.
4
5

See Ang (2020) for a critical review of accounts that use crony capitalism as analytical lense to analyze China.
See Zheng and Huang (2018, p. 378–424) for a detailed discussion of such personnel rotation.
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SPC emphasises fragmentation in China’s system as a result of competing interests of the various
state-businesses alliances and competition between different localities. Complementary to this, we
argue that the non-monolithic nature of the Chinese system also reflects a clear distinction between
essential and nonessential parts of the economy (Weber 2021). If we focus on only the nonessential
spheres of the economy, the Chinese state appears neoliberal. The Chinese economy can even be
considered more marketised than some of its European counterparts since it only marginally adheres
to the principle of decommodification at the core of European welfare states (Qi and Li 2018, Zheng
and Huang 2018, Weber 2019). But in the essential spheres the Chinese state actively constitutes the
market operating in an explicitly non-neoliberal fashion. A growing number of case studies on state–
market relations in China stresses that the state ‘permeates’ and ‘penetrates’ the market, but there is
no consensus what this means for the nature of China’s political economy. The diverging conclusions
on the degree and modalities of state control are to some extent due to a focus on a range of points
on the essential to nonessential spectrum. 6 By taking the essential–nonessential distinction into
account analytically, we can help resolve the contradiction of China’s internal variety of state–market
relations.
Conclusion
China has created a distinct economic system. The conceptual framework developed in this paper
aims to contribute to a theorisation of the economic mechanisms that underpin modes of state–market
relations. We propose the concept of a state-constituted market economy and argue that through
market-constituting activities the Chinese state seeks to ameliorate uncertainties and instabilities in
essential spheres of the economy while harnessing the power of market forces. This involves the
continuous redefinition of the boundaries of essential and nonessential sectors. The state creates and
participates in markets for essentials in order to stabilise and steer the economy as a whole. It thereby
For example, Jones and Zou (2017), focusing on the involvement of a Chinese SOE in one specific hydropower dam
project in Myanmar that is of geopolitical relevance but not essential to China’s power grid, suggest that the role of the
state in relation to SOEs is fragmented and in line with that of the regulatory state. In contrast, Chen and Lees (2016)
examine China’s developmental state in their analysis of the essential project for China’s overall economic security of
building up a renewable energy sector. Similarly, Allen et al. (2020), in their analysis of China’s solar PV industry which is
a key element of the renewable energy sector, find that China’s state-permeated capitalism is considerably less
fragmented and more closely coordinated than that of India. Zhang and Bray (2017) have demonstrated how the
expansion of the public higher education sector has at the same time created a shadow system of private schools and
tutoring, whereas the latter is organised based on a logic of what they call ‘micro-neoliberalism’.
6
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mobilises private market actors but at the same time aims to retain sovereignty over the essential parts
of the economy. This is a constant balancing act. The state enters a Faustian bargain with the market.
Market forces, once unleashed, can spiral out of control despite efforts to stabilise or steer them. The
state-constituted market economy has a more fine-grained state capacity to counter bubbles and
instabilities but is by no means free from crises, as the financial turmoil in 2015 and the attempts to
deflate the real estate sector in 2021 illustrate.
While we characterise the essential parts of China’s economic system by stressing the active state
participation in the market, peripheral spheres of the economy are largely left to private actors alone
and are only indirectly steered or stabilised through their links with essential sectors. One key to
understanding China’s political economy lies in capturing this dual nature. The state-constitution of
markets for essentials works not against commodification but rather facilitates a wide-ranging
commodification of all spheres of the economy. Further research is needed to conceptualise the
channels through which the state market-participation in essential sectors affects the nonessential ones
and to study the implications of state market-constitution for the role of fiscal and monetary policy.
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Appendix: Examples of state market-constitution in China
Mode

Examples

Details
• The state has functioned as the creator of a competitive market for infrastructure
financing where the regulator, buyers and sellers are all state actors. As China was
transitioning out of a directly planned economy, new mechanisms of finance were
needed to facilitate China’s strategic development projects, and CDB was designed as a
core, fully public institution. The state’s guarantee has enabled CDB bonds to receive
credit ratings as high as those of government bonds. Hence, CDB can raise most of its
funds from the capital market.

State market-

Example 1: China Development

creation

Bank (CBD) (Chen 2020)

• Chen summarises, ‘The state not only penetrates, permeates or regulates the market; it
is a component to the market. China’s interbank bond market to a large extent does
resemble a “competitive market” … its pricing mechanism is determined by market
supply and demand, and the players do react to market signals and seek profits. But the
major players that constitute this market are state owned. Such a sui generis state–
market relation reflects Chinese policy makers’ view of the role of the state in
development, that is, the state must rely on market mechanisms to achieve economic
development in an efficient manner, but if there is no market out there, the state should
create one by transforming existing state actors into market players.’ (Chen 2020, p.
464–5)
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Mode

Examples

Details
• Petry (2020a) analyses how the Chinese state has created domestic capital markets and
gradually integrated them with global markets. The state has set up state-owned
exchanges and organises the market infrastructure, but unlike the CDB, the players on

Example 2: State-owned exchanges
(Petry 2020a)

the exchanges are profit-driven, speculating investors.
• The state has shaped the market in ways that harness the dynamism of private capital
but constrain the scope for speculation: ‘Instead of placing trust in markets’ ability to
self-correct and achieve “efficient” outcomes, in China, assessments about the social
usefulness of financial trading are made – that “finance should serve the real
economy”.’ (ibid., p. 10)
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Mode

Examples

Details
• China has pursued massive construction of infrastructure in recent decades, with the
goal of extending the original market, building new connections between market
players, and deepening the division of labor. Ang’s (2016, 173–174 ) case study of a
town in Fujian illustrates the role of the construction of a railway on local investment
and local ‘market building’. China has built the world’s largest high-speed railway
network which has drastically intensified original cross-regional connections.
• A World Bank report shows that 18 per cent of passengers would not have traveled if

Example 3: Infrastructure

the high-speed railway were not available. The high-speed railway has helped relatively

construction (Ang 2016, Lawrence

remote places such as Guilin, Guiyang and Qufu to attract new passengers and expand

et al. 2019, Huang 2020)

their tourism markets (Lawrence et al. 2019).
• The core motivation of the Belt and Road Initiatives is to facilitate trade and create new
market connections through improving infrastructural conditions. As part of the
initiatives, the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe Railway has made Chongqing, an inland city
in southwest China, a major trading hub and an important exporter for Europe,
challenging the traditional advantages of coastal cities. Manufacturers based in
Chongqing, such as Hewlett-Packard and Foxconn, produced 25 million laptop
computers per year for the EU market (Huang 2020).

22

Mode

Examples

Details
• Even though somewhat less essential than grain, pork has become an important
consumption good for most Chinese people, and the price of pork has significant
importance in the official consumer price index. The state’s control over pork is less
strict than its control of grain; nonetheless, the government operates a frozen pork
reserve through a state-owned firm, China Merchandise Reserve Management Center.

Example 4: Essential goods

• During 2020, when pork price rose rapidly due to the impact of the swine fever in the

reserves (Weber and Qi 2020,

preceding two years, the Reserve Management Center constantly released reserves of

Bloomberg 2021)

frozen pork while also importing pork on a large scale in order to increase domestic
supply (Qi 2020).

State market-

• Similarly, when the world oil prices collapsed in 2020, the Chinese state reserves made

stabilisation

headlines about their global buying spree, stocking up reserves to ensure greater energy
resilience as well as to have leverage to insulate the domestic market from later price
hikes (Bloomberg 2021).
• In the context of the inflationary pressures that have arisen in the context of the
Example 5: Medical supplies under
COVID-19 (Qi 2020)

COVID-19 post-shutdown recoveries, China has focused its efforts on stabilising the
prices of key commodities that showed rapid price rises. The state played a crucial role
in meeting the rapid increase in the demand of medical supply and personal protective
equipment and avoided a vicious cycle of inflation and infection.
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Mode

Examples

Details
• In the initial two weeks after the city of Wuhan was locked down on 23 January 2020,
China mobilised official reserves of medical supply and imported massively (328 million
masks and 3.9 million gowns) through both state-owned and private businesses.
• The ultimate solution to the shortage was not reserves or imports but the state’s
mobilisation and coordination of production through two agencies: the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) and NDRC. These state agencies sent
officials to key production firms, collecting data daily, coordinating the supply of raw
materials and equipment, and helping those firms improve technologies and ramp up
output at an enormous pace. By 25 February 2020, the production of medical masks
and gowns met the domestic demand (Qi 2020).
• In China a complex infrastructure for targeted investments importantly involves the
SOEs. Rather than focusing on the macroeconomic dimension of expanding fiscal

Example 6: Counter-cyclical
investments of SOEs (Qi and
Kotz 2019)

spending in order to lift up aggregate demand in response to a crisis, China’s
stabilisation policies for the economy involve the mobilisation of state and private
businesses around tailored investment programs. These programs are usually focused
on major innovation, infrastructure building, and improving basic living conditions.
SOEs, who are more willing to implement riskier investments, are leading investors in
these programs.
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Mode

Examples

Details
• Qi and Kotz (2019) find that since the early 2000s the investments of SOEs have been
significantly countercyclical and have played a crucial role in stabilising reginal
economic growth. SOEs are not only boosting economic growth with counter-cyclical
investments but also playing a leading role in major innovations.
• As Petry (2020a, b) shows, a complex institutional infrastructure has been designed
‘with control in mind’ to contain speculation instead of simply assuming that
unregulated markets would be self regulating. As for the rest of the economy within the
financial sector, we observe the logic of tight control over essential functions and
entities: Borrowing Petry’s (2020b) terminology, ‘pivotal points’ are state-controlled, but
instead of operating based on a command-and-control logic, they follow market

Example 7: 2015–2016 stock

principles – as market designers, participants and managers to ensure that ‘finance

market crash (Li et al. 2020, Petry

serves the real economy’.

2020a, 2020b)

• To avoid the building up of bubbles, transaction-supervision departments monitor
trading activities in order to detect potential market manipulation and ensure stability.
When such prevention strategies fail, the Chinese state reverts to the same logic of
stabilising market participation that we have traced in other essential sectors. This
became apparent in the context of the 2015–2016 market crash.
• Concerned with the bubble, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
strengthened regulations in 2015, which however triggered the burst of the bubble. In
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Mode

Examples

Details
response to the crash, CSRC mobilised state-controlled financial institutions to stop
selling and bailout the market by massively buying stocks (Li et al. 2020), thus reversing
the panic and stopping the free fall of the market.
• The local government is the only lawful owner and supplier of urban land, but the
demand for land comes from a multitude of players, most of whom are private firms.
Local governments lease the land to non-state users for a fixed period. Monopolising
the urban land supply has allowed local municipal governments to obtain land revenues
as an important supplement to local fiscal income, which has financed in considerable
rapid and large-scale urbanisation and local infrastructure building since the mid-1990s

Example 8: Urban land (Tao et al.

(Xu 2011; Knight 2014; Zheng and Huang 2018).

State market-

2010, Xu 2011, Knight 2014, Liu

steering

2018, Zheng and Huang 2018, Lan

through one-on-one negotiation instead of public bidding, which can lower the price

2021)

and thus attract manufacturing investments (Tao et al. 2010). In this way, local

• A common practice of local governments is to lease land for manufacturing firms

governments are shaping the outcome of the land market to generate a stable income
stream and pursue economic development goals.
• State-owned investment platforms hold a lot of urban land and have easy access to
credit. They not only play a crucial role in municipal infrastructure building but also are
the key player in supporting the development of highly risky frontier technologies.
Domestic high-tech companies such as BOE and TCL in the LCD industry and
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Mode

Examples

Details
Suntech in the photovoltaic industry have substantially benefited from the financial
support of state-owned investment platforms.
• Since 2014 local governments have established industrial guiding funds, which are stateowned venture capitals that make investments in high-tech companies. By June 2019,
industrial guiding funds amounted to 4 trillion yuan (Lan 2021).
• By early 2021, the number of electric cars in China had reached 5.8 million; this
accounts for 50 per cent of electric cars globally (Xinhua-News 2021). China proposed
a plan for the development of electric cars as early as 2012, aiming at overcoming the
reliance on oil, countering environmental pressures, and transforming the traditional
auto-manufacturing industry into a technological leader.

Example 9: Electric cars (State

• The state has provided substantial subsidies but, importantly, it also shaped the

Council 2012, Altenburg et al.

expectations of potential manufacturers and customers through creating a state-

2017)

supported ecosystem for electric car innovation, investing in a wide and dense network
of charging infrastructure, running a more favorable plate allocation system for electric
cars, encouraging the usage of electric cars as taxies, and pledging that by 2035 no new
combustion-engine automobiles may be sold in China.
• These policies have created a clear expectation that profitability and survival on the
Chinese market for car manufacturers will depend on their competitiveness in electric
cars – a powerful form of steering the business activities of a whole sector.
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